Introduction
The simple and elegant two-party key agreement scheme of Diffie and Hellman has to a large extent gotten the credit for introducing the concept of public key cryptography. The scheme has been the basis for a relatively large number of cryptographic protocols. Since it lacks user authentication, a number of these schemes provide user authentication. Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement is also the basis for a number of group-oriented key agreement schemes known as conference key agreement protocols. A common characteristic of the schemes of this class of cryptographic protocols is that they have a varying degree of efficiency in terms of the number of rounds of message transmissions and the number of computations and exponentiations for each participant.
In this paper, we introduce a new approach for secure group key computation that is in agreement with the DiffieHellman key agreement paradigm, and that is mostly beneficial concerning efficiency and elegancy. In contrast to using public keys computed as exponentiations, our scheme uses public keys that are computed on a fractional form. The fractional public keys are used as exponents for computing group keys according to a modified version of the Diffie-Hellman scheme. Since public user keys are used as exponents, any number of public keys can be used simultaneously, meaning that the presented scheme is a true multiparty shared key establishment scheme providing convenient and efficient group-oriented key agreement. Since the value of the group key is based on the long-term public keys of the participants, no data transmissions are required. The scheme hence provides zero-round multi-party DiffieHellman key agreement.
Related work
The concept of fractional public keys is influenced by the cryptographic scheme proposed in [5] . In this paper, a collusion resistant threshold cryptosystem is proposed by using private user keys (user shares) that is computed on a fraction form, where the numerator and denominator are secret polynomials. As will be subsequently shown, fractional public keys provide an efficient secure group key computation.
Public key cryptography has been credited W. Diffie and M. Hellman for their classical two-party key agreement scheme from 1976 [4] . This scheme has since been used as basis for great number of subsequent cryptographic schemes. The lack of user and/or key authentication in the original Diffie-Hellman (DH) scheme has caused the proposal of many extended DH schemes. These are basically key agreement protocols with user authentication, and some others are user authentication protocols. An interesting overview over this family of cryptographic schemes can be found in Chapter 5 of [2] .
Although the DH scheme is a two-party protocol, some authors have proposed generalizations of the DH scheme for conference key agreement (CKA). An early unauthenticated DH-CKA protocol was proposed by Ingemarsson et al. [6] . This scheme has a relatively high overhead concerning computation and the number of transmitted messages. Steiner et al. [11] presented three protocols named GDH.1, GDH.2 and GDH.3, which can be regarded as variations of [6] . They are more efficient concerning the number of computations and transmitted messages, but require more rounds than [6] .
Burmester and Desmedt [3] proposed an elegant multiparty generalization of DH, which provides relatively high efficiency, and requires only 2 rounds and 3 exponentiations. Since each user broadcasts the message of the second round to the others, it is highly suitably for wireless networks.
Identity-based authenticated protocols have among others been proposed by Koyoma and Otha [7, 8] , and Saeednia and Safavi-Naini whose DH-CKA protocol [10] is based on the Burmester-Desmedt protocol [3] . Ateniese et al. [1] extended the GDH.2 scheme [11] for user authentication. Also see Chapter 6 of [2] for an excellent overview of DH-CKA protocols and for comparisons.
2 Zero-round multi-party Diffie-Hellman key agreement from fractional public keys
In this section, we present the new cryptographic grouporiented key computation scheme. It consists of an initialization phase requiring a trusted party providing each user with a public/private long-term user key pair. The group keys are computed as a function of the long-term user keys of any given user coalition. Each user can therefore compute group keys offline for any user coalition the given user is a member of, without computing and transmitting key establishment messages.
Initialization. A Trusted Authority (TA) selects two large secret primes p and q, where the product n = p · q is public. According to the RSA public key cryptosystem [9] , the TA selects a public number e that is relatively prime to φ(n) = (p − 1) · (q − 1), and computes a secret number d so that
Let U denote a group of an arbitrary number of users, where T ⊆ U denotes an arbitrary user subset. The cryptosystem allows all members of T ⊆ U to securely compute a shared secret group key. Hence, the scheme provides secure multi-party key agreement with the advantage that secret group keys can be computed without user interaction and key establishment data transmissions.
Public/private user key computation. The TA generates for each participant P i ∈ U a random secret number x i ∈ Z φ(n) . The TA selects for each P i ∈ U a public number I i , so that (d + I i ) is relatively prime to φ(n). The public I i could for example represent a meaningful identity of P i .
The TA computes the public key for P i ∈ U as
and the corresponding private key
where M denotes the maximum possible size of any user coalition T . (The coalition max size must consequently be the same as or less than the total number of users assigned such long-term user keys.) The private key k i is transmitted to P i ∈ U through a secure channel.
Group key computation. At this stage, the participants of a user coalition T ⊆ U compute the shared group key K T according the following method:
Note that the values of c i,j are independent of the value of the secret d. It can also be noted as a matter of form that the value of d is fixed although g i (d) refers to a polynomial. For j ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}, let
Each P i ∈ T computes the secret group key K T for that coalition T ⊆ U according to
Security analysis
In this section, we present the relevant security assumptions and security requirements of the presented scheme, and then we show that the actual security of the scheme is in agreement with the given security requirements.
Security requirements
We assume that there exists a set U of an arbitrary number of users. A group key K T is computed as a function of the long-term user keys of any user subset T ⊆ U. It can be assumed an adversary A that is equivalent with a user coalition A ⊆ U, where A ∩ T = ∅ for any coalition T ⊆ U.
Adversary assumptions. We assume that A may hold the following information:
• The private user keys
• The group keys K T * = α j|P j ∈T * xj (mod n) for any T * ⊆ U, where T * = T .
• The public user key y i for each P i ∈ U.
Security requirements. There is no communication required to compute group keys K T , which are computed as a function of the long-term user keys of the user coalition T ⊆ U. Data to be communicated confidentially is encrypted by means of a secure symmetric key cryptographic algorithm using the secret group key as cryptokey. Assuming that the symmetric key cryptographic algorithm used is secure, the security of the scheme is based on the difficulty for an adversary (or coalition of adversaries) A, to violate the following security requirements:
Security Requirement 1. Secrecy of private keys. It must be computationally infeasible to obtain private user keys.
Security Requirement 2. Secrecy of group keys.
No other than the members of a given coalition T ⊆ U must be able to compute the shared secret group key K T corresponding to the long-term user keys of the given participants.
Security Requirement 3. Coalition resistance. It must be prevented that any colluding user coalition A ⊆ U may violate the two former security requirements.
The security of the presented scheme is based on the secrecy of φ(n), d and x j (for any P i ∈ U). We will now in this regard present some relevant observations: Observation 1. Secrecy of the secret parameters d and x j (for any P i ∈ U) concerning fractional public keys. The public keys are computed according to
which corresponds to the equation (mod n), the secret x i (for any P i ∈ U) is accordingly protected due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Observation 2c. The secrecy of d given the public e and n is in agreement with the RSA public key cryptosystem [9] .
holding the private user key k i,0 can by means of the corresponding public user key y i compute
Given W j−1 , 1 < j < M, the following computations can be carried recursively out:
This attack requires computation of inverses modulo φ(n). Since n is a large composite number, computing φ(n) is equivalent of solving the Factorization Problem, which is known to be computationally infeasible.
Security requirements
We will now provide the security proofs of the security requirements.
Proof of Security Requirement 1. Security of private keys. According to Observations 1 and 2a-c, it is infeasible to deduce both d and x i (for any P i ∈ U) from public/private keys and group keys. Since the private keys are on the form w i,j = α xi·d j , private keys can thus not be obtained by this computation since d and x i (for any P i ∈ U) are secret.
According to Observation 3, computation of
It can be noted that given W j and W j+1 would allow computation of private keys according to
It is therefore computationally infeasible to compute private keys by this computation without knowledge of the secret φ(n), where computing φ(n) is equivalent of solving the Factorization Problem. Thus, disclosure of private keys is prevented, and the scheme is secure in agreement with Security Requirement 1. Proof of Security Requirement 3. Collusion resistance. Regarding disclosure of numbers, where the difficulty of achieving this based on a number theoretical problem like the Factorization Problem or DLP, the number of colluding participants does not affect the hardness of such problems. This leaves the problem of solving the linear equation system corresponding to a set of any number of public user keys, as pointed out in Section 3.1, where the equation x i = y i · d + y i · I i corresponds to the public key y i . Accordingly, since two or more public keys y j for P j ∈ U correspond likewise to an underdefined linear equation system, it is not possible to solve such an equation system. The scheme is thus collusion resistant to any number of colluding parties. The scheme is therefore collusion resistant, and the scheme is secure in agreement with Security Requirement 3.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the novel concept of fractional public keys and an efficient zero-round multiparty Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme based on fractional public keys. The fractional keys enable public keys to be used as exponents, thereby allowing a novel variation of Diffie-Hellman key agreement with no key data transmissions.
